Rethinking the Trigger of Backdoor Attack by Li, Yiming et al.
Rethinking the Trigger of Backdoor Attack
Yiming Li∗
Tsinghua Shenzhen International
Graduate School, Tsinghua University
li-ym18@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Tongqing Zhai∗
Tsinghua Shenzhen International
Graduate School, Tsinghua University
dtq18@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn
Baoyuan Wu†
Tencent AI Lab
wubaoyuan1987@gmail.com
Yong Jiang
Tsinghua Shenzhen International
Graduate School, Tsinghua University
jiangy@sz.tsinghua.edu.cn
Zhifeng Li
Tencent AI Lab
michaelzfli@tencent.com
Shutao Xia†
Tsinghua Shenzhen International
Graduate School, Tsinghua University
xiast@sz.tsinghua.edu.cn
ABSTRACT
Backdoor attacks raise serious security concerns about obtaining or
training models through third-party platforms. Backdoor attackers
add a specific trigger (i.e., a local patch) onto some training images
to encourage that the testing images with the same trigger are
incorrectly predicted, while the natural testing images are correctly
predicted by the trained model. Many backdoor attack and defense
methods are proposed, whereas the property or the behavior of the
attacked model has not been well studied.
In this paper, we start with the study of the property of the
backdoor trigger. Most existing works adopted the setting that the
triggers across the training and testing images follow the same
appearance and are located in the same area. However, we demon-
strate that such an attack paradigm is vulnerable when the trigger
in testing images is not consistent with the one used for training.
If the appearance or location of the trigger is slightly changed,
then the attack performance may degrade sharply. Inspired by this
property, we further verify that existing attacks are transformation
vulnerable. In other words, introducing a transformation-based pre-
processing (e.g., flipping and scaling) on the testing image before
prediction is effective to defend many state-of-the-art backdoor
attacks. The defense performance of this simple strategy is on par
with state-of-the-art defenses, while with nearly no extra computa-
tional cost. Furthermore, we also propose a transformation-based
attack enhancement to improve the robustness of existing attacks
towards transformation-based defense. Extensive experiments ver-
ify that the enhanced attack is robust to transformations and is also
effective under the setting of physical attack.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated their superior
performance in a variety of applications, such as in computer vision
[8, 21, 31] and natural language processing [9, 37, 46]. However,
DNNs have been proved to be unstable that the small perturbation
on the input may lead to a significant change in the output, which
raise serious security concerns. For example, given one trained
DNN model and one benign example, the malicious perturbation
could be optimized to encourage that the perturbed example will be
misclassified, while the perturbation is too small to be perceivable
to human eyes. It is dubbed adversarial attack, which happens in
the inference state [12, 15, 32].
In contrast, some recent studies showed that DNNs could also
be fooled by some regular (i.e., non-optimized) perturbations (e.g.,
the local patch stamped on the right-bottom corner of the image
shown in Figure 1), through influencing the model weights in the
training process. It is called as backdoor attack1. Specifically, some
training examples are modified by adding one trigger (e.g., the local
patch). Thesemodified exampleswith attacker-specified target label,
together with normal training samples, are fed into the DNN model
for training. Consequently, the trained DNN model performs well
on the normal testing examples, similarly with the model trained
using only normal examples; however, if the same trigger used in
training is added onto a testing example, then its prediction will be
changed to the target label specified by the attacker. The backdoor
attack could happen in the scenario that the training process is
inaccessible or out of control by the user. For example, the user may
use a trained DNN model bought from the third-party supplier or
downloaded from the open-source. Since the infected DNN model
performs normally on normal examples, the user is difficult to
realize the existence of the backdoor; even the trigger is present,
since it is usually just a regular local patch or even invisible, the user
is also difficult to identify the reason of the incorrect prediction.
Hence, the insidious backdoor attack is a serious threat to the
practical application of DNNs.
1Backdoor attack is also commonly called the Trojan attack, such as in [6, 10, 29].
In this paper, ‘backdoor attack’ refers specifically to attack methods that modify the
training samples to create the backdoor, and we only focus on the image classification.
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Figure 1: The comparison between different existing de-
fenses and the proposed transformation-based defenses
from the aspect of average training time and attack suc-
cess rate under BadNets attack. We demonstrate two simple
transformations, including flipping (Flip) and padding after
shrinking (ShrinkPad) for the defense. In this example, the
trigger is a 4-pixels gray square on the bottom right corner.
Many backdoor attacks have been proposed to design different
types of triggers, such as [7, 17, 25, 26, 45]. It is interesting to
find that most of existing works adopted the same setting that
the triggers across the training and testing images are located in
the same area and have the same appearance, to the best of our
knowledge. However, the usermaymodify the testing images before
prediction, such that the trigger’s location and appearance could
be changed. It raises an intriguing question that
when the trigger in the attacked testing image is different from
that used in training, can it still activate the backdoor?
To answer this question, we explore the impacts of two impor-
tant characteristics of the backdoor trigger, including location and
appearance. As shown in later experiments, we observe that if the
location or appearance of the trigger is slightly changed, then the
attack performance may degrade sharply. It reveals that the back-
door attack with the fixed trigger may be non-robust to the change
of trigger. The above observation inspires two further questions:
(1) Can we utilize the non-robustness to defend existing backdoor
attacks? (2) How to enhance the performance of backdoor attack such
that it is robust to the change of trigger?
In this work, we firstly propose a simple yet effective defense
method that the testing example is spatially transformed (e.g., flip-
ping or scaling) before the prediction. The spatial transformation
on the whole image is a feasible approach to change the trigger’s
location and appearance, which may deactivate hidden backdoor in
the attack. Meanwhile, since the spatial transformation is conducted
on normal training images as preprocessing in training, it will not
significantly influence the prediction of normal testing images. A
simple experimental comparison is presented in Figure 1, which
demonstrates that the proposed transformation-based defense is on
par with state-of-the-art defenses with much lower cost. Further-
more, we also propose to enhance the robustness of the backdoor
attack that all poisoned images will be randomly transformed be-
fore feeding into the training process. The proposed method is
equivalent to adding a preprocessing step on the poisoned images.
This enhancement could be naturally combined with any backdoor
attack method. Consequently, the attack’s robustness to the change
of trigger is significantly enhanced, and the attack can evade the
proposed transformation-based defense.
The main contributions of this work are four-fold.
• We demonstrate that the location and the appearance of
the backdoor trigger have crucial impacts on activating the
backdoor.
• We verify that existing attacks are transformation vulnerable,
based on which we propose a simple, effective, and efficient
transformation-based defense method.
• We propose an effective method to enhance the robustness
of existing backdoor attacks to the change of trigger.
• Extensive experiments verify the effectiveness of the pro-
posed methods.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Backdoor Attacks on DNNs
Backdoor attack is an emerging research area, which raises seri-
ous concerns about obtaining or handing models to third-party
platforms for training. Similar to the data poisoning [1, 3, 28], back-
door adversary tampers the training process to achieve their goals.
However, these methods have different purposes. Specifically, the
target of data poisoning is to degrade the model’s performance on
legitimate inputs, whereas the backdoor attack is aiming to misclas-
sify inputs from a source class as a target class when the input is
manipulated by adding a backdoor trigger. Meanwhile, the infected
model can still correctly recognize the label for any benign sample.
Note that the backdoor attack is also different from the adversarial
attack [15, 19, 32]. A more comprehensive comparison between
backdoor attack and adversarial attack is shown in Section 2.3.
The backdoor attack was first proposed in [17, 18]. After that,
[7] suggested that only a small number of poisoning samples are
needed to be injected into the training data, while the pattern of the
backdoor trigger can be arbitrarily designed by attackers. Specif-
ically, they showed that even a random noise can also be used as
the trigger pattern, which is hard to notice by human beings. A
more recent and practical approach, dubbed Trojan Attack, which
is applicable when the adversary does not have access to the clean
training data, was proposed in [29]. Besides, in this work, they
improved the attack performance by designing triggers based on
values that would induce the maximum response of specific internal
neurons in the DNNs. This approach builds a stronger connection
between triggers and internal neurons and can inject effective back-
doors with fewer training samples. Several other backdoor attacks
have also been proposed for different purposes [2, 20, 39, 50]. Most
recently, [45] proposed a label-consistent backdoor attack for back-
door attacks to remain undetected. Although various backdoor
attack methods are proposed, research on the mechanisms and
properties of the backdoor attack is left far behind.
2.2 Backdoor Defenses
To defend the backdoor attacks, several backdoor defense meth-
ods were proposed. These methods can be roughly divided into
four main categories, including detection-based defense [5, 13, 44]
(which identifies whether there is a backdoor in the model based
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on the properties of the backdoor), preprocessing-based defense
[30] (which conducts data preprocessing before prediction), trigger-
reconstruction based defense [6, 36, 47] (which reconstructs the
triggers and then removes the backdoor to ‘patch’ the infected
model), and model-reconstruction based defense [27, 30] (which
defends backdoor attacks by directly reconstructing the model,
such as by pruning or fine-tuning). Unfortunately, existing defense
methods either have high computational complexity or reduce the
prediction accuracy of benign samples significantly. How to defend
against backdoor attacks is still an important open question.
In particular, some researches designed defense methods based
on the property of infected networks or the poisoned samples
[44, 47]. For example, [44] showed that backdoor attacks tend to
leave behind a detectable trace in the spectrum of the covariance
of a feature representation learned by the neural network, which
can be used to identify and remove poisoned inputs. However, [42]
demonstrated that the proposed properties are not universal, and
therefore their corresponding defense can be easily bypassed. We
have to admit that our understanding of backdoor mechanisms is
still under development.
2.3 Adversarial Attacks and its Connection
with Backdoor Attacks
DNNs are known to be vulnerable to different types ofwell-designed
small adversarial perturbations. The process of finding adversarial
perturbation such that the classifiermisbehaves on the perturbed ex-
ample is dubbed adversarial attack. The adversarial attack was first
proposed in the image classification tasks, and the target of attack-
ers was to find pixel-wise adversarial perturbations. To obtain the
perturbation, Goodfellow proposed the fast gradient sign method
(FGSM), which generates adversarial examples by maximizing the
loss along the gradient direction [16]. After that, projected gradient
descent (PGD), which can be regarded as an iterative version of
FGSM, was proposed and reached significantly better performance
[24]. To reach a smaller adversarial perturbation, Deepfool finds the
smallest perturbation by exploring the nearest decision boundary
[34]. Except for the aforementioned attacks, many other algorithms
[4, 11, 51] have also been developed to find the adversarial pertur-
bation in the image classification. Besides, adversarial attacks in
other tasks, such as in object detection [43, 49] and tracking [22, 48],
were also proposed.
Indeed, adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks enjoy certain
similarities. For example, both types of attacks intend to modify
the benign image to make the classifier misbehave at the inference-
time. Especially when the adversarial attacks are with universal
perturbation (e .д., [33, 35, 43]), the perturbations of those attacks
have a similar pattern. This connection is also used in the backdoor
defense. For example, Wang et al . proposed to reconstruct the
trigger of backdoor networks based on the generation of universal
perturbation towards every class for the defense [47].
Although adversarial attacks and backdoor attacks share a great
amount of similarities, they do have essential differences and can be
easily distinguished. (1) From the perspective of attack’s capacity,
the attackers of adversarial attack can control the inference process
(to a certain extent) but not the training process of models. Specifi-
cally, given a benign sample x , adversarial attackers can generate
Figure 2: An illustration of the backdoor attack. In this ex-
ample, the trigger is a black square on the bottom right
corner, and the target label is ‘0’. During the training pro-
cess, part of the training set is modified to have the trigger
stamped, and their corresponding label is re-assigned as the
target label. As a result, the trained DNN is infected, which
will recognize attacked images (i .e ., test images with trigger)
as the target label while still correct recognize the label for
the benign images.
its adversarial version x ′ by utilizing the information of the in-
ference process, while the parameter and structure of the model
are both fixed. In contrast, for backdoor attackers, parameters of
the model can be modified whereas the inference process is out of
control; (2) From the aspect of perturbation, i .e ., x ′−x , it is known
(i .e ., non-optimized) by backdoor attackers whereas adversarial
attackers need to obtain it through optimization. Besides, the per-
turbation of adversarial attacks is usually image-specific, whereas
it is universal for all images in backdoor attacks; (3) The principle
of two types of attacks are also different. Adversarial attack exists
since the model is non-robust, or more essentially, its behaviors
are different from those of humans. In contrast, backdoor attackers
utilize the excellent learning ability towards features of models.
3 THE PROPERTY OF EXISTING ATTACKS
In this section, we discuss the property of existing backdoor attacks.
Specifically, we demonstrate that the attack performance may de-
grade sharply, when the trigger in the attacked testing image is
slightly different from that used for training.
3.1 Standard Backdoor Attack
We consider the scenario that the user cannot fully control the train-
ing process of the model C(·;w). For example, the model is bought
from a third-party supplier, which provides the structure andweight
ofC(·;w), but hides the training details. Or, if the local resource is in-
sufficient, the user may provide the training set Dtrain = {(x ,y)}
with x ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 255}C×W ×H , the model structure, as well as
the training configurations, to a third-party platform for training.
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The obtained model C(·;w) performs normally on benign images,
whereas it may have been infected with some insidious backdoors.
In this paper, we consider the targeted backdoor attack, where
the target label is ytarдet . As shown in Figure 2, the typical process
of the targeted backdoor attack consists of two steps: (1) generating
the poisoned image xpoisoned by stamping one trigger onto x , as
well as the target label ytarдet ; (2) feeding both the benign and
poisoned images into the training process.
The Generation of Poisoned Images. As stated above, generat-
ing poisoned images is the first step of backdoor attack. Specifically,
the poisoned image xpoisoned is generated through a stamping
process S based on the trigger xtr iддer , i .e .,
xpoisoned = S(x ;xtr iддer ) = (1 − α ) ⊗ x + α ⊗ xtr iддer , (1)
where α ∈ [0, 1]C×W ×H indicates the trade-off hyper-parameter.
Note that when α ∈ {0, 1}C×W ×H , it serves as a mask to locate the
trigger, as did in BadNets [18]; when α ∈ [0, 1)C×W ×H , it becomes
a blending matrix which was firstly proposed in [7].
Training Process.We denoteDbeniдn as all benign samples used
for backdoor training (Dbeniдn ⊂ Dtrain ), and denote the set of
poisoned samples as Dpoisoned = {(xpoisoned ,ytarдet )}. Both of
them are utilized to train the model, as follows
min
w
E(x,y)∈Dpoisoned∪DbeniдnL (C(x ;w),y) , (2)
where L(·) indicates the loss function, such as the cross entropy.
The above problem can be optimized by the back-propagation [38]
with the stochastic gradient descent [52].
3.2 The Effects of Different Characteristics
One backdoor trigger can be specified by two independent char-
acteristics, including location and appearance. To study their indi-
vidual effects to backdoor attack, we firstly present their accurate
definitions in Definition 2. One illustrative example is also shown
in Figure 3.
Definition 1 (Minimum Covering Box). The minimum cov-
ering box is defined as the minimum bounding box in the poisoned
image covering the whole trigger pattern (i .e ., all non-zero α entries).
Definition 2 (Two Characteristics of Backdoor Trigger).
• Location: The location of the pixel at the bottom right corner
of the minimum covering box.
• Appearance: The color value and the specific arrangement of
pixels corresponding to non-zero α entries in the minimum
covering box.
EvaluationCriteria ofAttacks.Weadopt the attack performance
to measure the effect, which is specified as the attack success rate
(ASR). It is defined as the accuracy of attacked images predicted by
the infected classifier C(·; wˆ) with stamping process S , i .e .,
ASRC (S) = Pr(x ,y)∈Dtest
[
C (S(x)) = ytarдet |y , ytarдet
]
. (3)
For the sake of brevity, we will use ASR(·) instead, if specifying
C(·; wˆ) is not necessary.
Experimental Settings. In the following, we use BadNets as an
example to study the effects of location and appearance. We use
VGG-19 [41] and ResNet-34 [21] as themodel structure, and conduct
Figure 3: The illustration of characteristics of the backdoor
trigger. The red box represents the boundary of the mini-
mum covering box, and the red pixel indicates the trigger
location. The trigger color has only two different values (0
or 128).
(a) VGG-19 (b) ResNet-34
Figure 4: The heatmap of the attack success rate when the
trigger is in different position at attacked images. The right
corner is the position of the trigger in the poisoned images
used for training.
experiments in CIFAR-10 [23] dataset. The trigger is a 3 × 3 black-
gray square, as shown in Figure 3. The trade-off hyper-parameterα
is set asα ∈ {0, 1}3×32×32. The values ofα entries corresponding to
the pixels located in the minimum covering box are 1, while other
values are 0. In terms of training, we adopt the SGDwithmomentum
0.9, weight decay 10−4, and batch size 128 for all training processes.
We train VGG-19 through 164 epochs with an initial learning rate of
0.1, which is decreased by a factor 10 at epochs 81 and 122; and train
ResNet-34 through 300 epochs with an initial learning rate of 0.1,
which is decreased by a factor 10 at epochs 150 and 250. The ratio
of poisoned samples in training set, i.e., R = Npoisoned(Npoisoned+Nbeniдn ) ,
is set to 0.25. All experiments are conducted on one single GeForce
GTX 1080 GPU, and the implementation is conducted based on the
open source code2.
The Effect of Location.While preserving the appearance of the
trigger, we change its location in inference process to study its effect
to the attack performance. As shown in Figure 4, when moving the
location with a small distance (2 ∼ 3 pixels, less than 10% of the
image size), the ASR will drop sharply from 100% to below 50%. It
tells that the attack performance is sensitive to the location of the
backdoor trigger on the attacked image.
2https://github.com/bearpaw/pytorch-classification
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Figure 5: Attack success rate and appearance of the trigger
with different non-zero color value in attacked images. The
red dot indicates the ASR of trigger with original color value
(128).
The Effect of Appearance.While keeping the location of the trig-
ger, we change its appearance in inference to study the appearance’s
effect on the attack performance. Note that the appearance could
be modified by changing the shape or the pixel values of the trigger.
For the sake of simplicity, here we only consider the change of pixel
values. Specifically, there are only two values of the pixels within
the trigger, i .e ., 0 and 128. We change the value 128 to different
values from 0 to 255. The ASR scores corresponding to different
pixel values are plotted in Figure 5. ASR degrades sharply along
with the decreasing of non-zero pixel values, while is not influenced
when the non-zero pixel values are increased. According to this
simple experiment, it is difficult to describe the exact relationship
between the change of appearance and the attack performance,
since the change modes of appearance are rather diverse. However,
it at least tells that the backdoor attack is sensitive to the difference
of appearance between the trigger on the attacked testing image
and that used in training.
4 TRANSFORMATION-BASED DEFENSE AND
ATTACK ENHANCEMENT
The studies presented in Section 3 demonstrate that the backdoor
attack is sensitive to the difference between the training trigger
and the testing trigger. It gives us two further questions: (1) Is it
possible to utilize such a sensitivity to defend the current backdoor
attacks? (2) How to enhance the robustness of the backdoor attack
to the change of trigger? We propose two simple yet effective ap-
proaches to answer this two questions in Section 4.1 and Section
4.2, respectively.
4.1 Backdoor Defense via Transformations
The answer to the first question is to change the location or appear-
ance of the trigger in the inference process, such that the modified
trigger may fail to activate the backdoor hidden in the model. How-
ever, the user doesn’t know the information of the trigger, it is
impossible to exactly manipulate the trigger. Instead, we propose
to change the whole image by spatial transformations (e.g., flipping
or scaling). As shown in Figure 1, the flipping changes the location
of the trigger, while the scaling (i.e., ShrinkPad) also changes the
appearance, due to the interpolation in resizing the trigger. Ac-
cordingly, we propose a transformation-based defense, as shown in
Definition 4.
Note that all transformations discussed in this paper are consid-
ered to be shape-preserving, as illustrated in Definition 3, unless
otherwise specified. For a given classifier C(·;w) (e .д., a trained
DNN), the shape-preserving transformation can be used in the
preprocessing process.
Definition 3 (shape-preserving transformation). Assuming
that all images x are normalized, i .e ., x ∈ [0, 1]C×W ×H . A transfor-
mation T (·;θ ) is called shape-preserving, if and only if
∀x ∈ [0, 1]C×W ×H ,T (x ;θ ) ∈ [0, 1]C×W ×H . (4)
Definition 4 (transformation-based defense). The defense
is defined as introducing a transformation-based pre-processing on
the testing image before prediction, i .e ., instead of predicting x , it
predicts T (x), where T (·) is a transformation.
This simple defense method enjoys several advantages: (1) it is
efficient because it only requires the transformation of the testing
image; (2) it is not designed to defend any specific backdoor method,
thus it may defendmany backdoormethods; (3) it may not influence
the prediction of normal testing images, as the preprocessing on
normal images had included similar transformations in the training
process. These advantages, as well as the defensive effectiveness,
will be verified in later experiments.
In particular, we suggest to use spatial transformations for the
defense, since it may probably change the location and appearance
of the trigger simultaneously, while the location has a direct connec-
tion to the backdoor activation. A more comprehensive discussion
about the selection of transformation will be discussed in Section
5.1-5.2.
4.2 Random Transformation-based Attack
Enhancement
As demonstrated in section 4.1, the standard backdoor attacks may
expire after the proposed transformation-based defense. In this
section, we discuss how to enhance existing attacks to evade the
transformation-based defense. To facilitate the subsequent studies,
we firstly present some necessary definitions, as follows.
Definition 5 (Transformation Robustness). The transforma-
tion robustness of attack with stamping process S under transforma-
tion T (·;θ ) (with parameter θ ), the RT (S), is defined as the attack
success rate after the transformation T , i .e .,
RT (S) = ASR(T (S)), (5)
where
ASR(T (S)) = Pr
(x ,y)∈D
[
C (T (S(x))) = ytarдet |y , ytarдet
]
.
Note that RT (S) ∈ [0, 1], and the larger value of RT (S) indicates
the higher robustness of the attack to the transformation T . Be-
sides, considering that defenders may not only use a single type
of transformation, it is necessary to enhance the robustness to the
compound transformation, which is defined in Definition 6.
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Figure 6: The pipeline of proposed random transformation-based attack enhancement. The input poisoned images first go
through a random transformation layer. Then the transformed poisoned images combining with benign samples will be used
for training the DNN. In this example, there are two transformation in the random transformation layer, including flipping
and padding after shrinking.
Definition 6 (Compound Transformation). The compound
transformationT (·;θ ) of a sequence of transformation with parameter
θi , the {T (·;θi )}ni=1, is formulated as the composition of a sequence
of transformation functions, i .e .,
T (·;θ ) = Tn (Tn−1(· · ·T1(·;θ1);θn−1);θn ), (6)
where θ = (θ1, · · · ,θn ).
Once the transformation is known by the attacker, a simple
method can be used to enhance the attack robustness. Specifically,
the generation of poisoned images, which was defined in Eq. (1), is
updated to as follows:
x ′poisoned = T (xpoisoned ;θ ) = T (S(x ;xtr iддer );θ ), (7)
which means that the poisoned images are pre-processed through
the compound transformation, before being fed into the training
process. Accordingly, similar to Eq. (2), the training objective is
updated as follows:
min
w
E(x ,y)∈D(T )poisoned∪Dbeniдn
L (C(x ;w),y) , (8)
where D(T )poisoned = {(x ′poisoned ,ytarдet )}.
Two remaining issues are how to determine the compound trans-
formation and the corresponding parameter θ . In practice, the at-
tacker is difficult to know the possible transformations for defence
adopted by the user. Even the adopted transformations are revealed
to the attacker, the exact parameters in transformations cannot be
known, as there may be randomness in practice (i.e., different scal-
ing factors in scaling transformation). To tackle this difficulty and
to ensure the attack capability to models with different possible de-
fenses, we specify T with the set of some common transformations
(which are probably used by defenders), such as flipping and scaling.
For each transformationTi , if there may be randomness in practice,
then we define a value domain Θi for θi . Θi is parameterized by
the maximal transformation size ϵ , i .e .,
Θi = {θ |dist(θ , I ) ≤ ϵi },
where disti (·, ·) is a given distance metric forTi , and I indicates the
identity transformation. For example, disti for the scaling transfor-
mation could be the ℓ1-norm of the difference between two scaling
factors. Consequently, the compound transformation used in the
enhanced attack is specified as T = {T (·;θ )|θ ∈ ∏ni=1 Θi }. Then,
the training objective of the enhanced attack is formulated as
min
w
Eθ
[
E(x ,y)∈D(T (·;θ ))poisoned∪Dbeniдn
[L (C(x ;w),y)]
]
. (9)
To solve the problem (9) exactly, attackers need to conduct the
training process with all possible transformed variants, which is
not time-effective and computation-consuming. Instead, we propose
a sampling-based training method for efficiency. Specifically, for
each poisoned image, to handle the expectation over all possible
configurations of θ , we sample one configuration, i.e., θ ∼∏ni=1 Θi ,
based on which we transform the original poisoned images. Then,
we use the transformed poisoned images and normal images for
training. The training process of the proposed enhanced attack is
briefly illustrated in Figure 6.
Note that ϵi inΘi can be regarded as a trade-off hyper-parameter
between the performance and the robustness to the transformation-
based defense. When ϵi is relatively large, it can conquer stronger
transformation-based defenses, whereas the clean accuracy and
attack successful rate without defense may have significantly re-
duction; when ϵ is too small, the attacked images can not activate
the backdoor after the transformation-based defense. This point
will be verified in later experiments.
5 EXPERIMENT
In this section, we first discuss the influence of transformations in
the proposed defense. Thenwe demonstrate that the transformation-
based attack enhancement is effective in improving the robustness.
Besides, we also visualize the saliency maps of different attacks, and
demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed enhanced attacks under
the settings of physical attack. The effect of key hyper-parameters
in proposed methods is also discussed at the end.
5.1 Defense with Spatial Transformation
In this section, we verify the effectiveness of proposed defense with
spatial transformations. We examine two simple spatial transforma-
tions, including left-right flipping (dubbed Flip), and padding after
shrinking (dubbed ShrinkPad). Specifically, ShrinkPad consists of
shrinking (based on bilinear interpolation) with a few pixels (i .e .,
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Table 1: Comparison of different backdoor defenses in CIFAR-10 dataset. ‘Clean’ and ‘ASR’ indicates clean test accuracy (%)
and attack success rate (%) on test set, respectively. The transformation-based defenses including flipping (dubbed Flip) and
random padding after shrinking (dubbed ShrinkPad). The ShrinkPad including shrinking (based on bilinear interpolation) up
to 4 pixels, and random padding around the shrunk figure to change its size back to the one of original image.
VGG-19 ResNet-34
BadNets Blended Attack Consistent Attack BadNets Blended Attack Consistent Attack
Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR
Standard 91.9 100 91.5 100 91.3 95.6 94.1 100 93.1 100 93.1 98.7
Fine-Pruning 91.3 0.7 83.6 0.2 72.6 0.1 92.1 0 91.9 0.3 92.0 18.9
Neural Cleanse 83.3 0.6 90.6 0.4 86.4 0.7 91.4 0.7 91.4 0.5 91.2 1.4
Auto-Encoder 86.4 2.1 86.0 1.7 85.4 2.3 87.5 2.7 87.2 1.9 88.4 2.1
Flip 91.0 1.1 91.1 0.9 90.5 95.7 93.6 0.8 92.8 0.8 92.3 98.8
ShrinkPad-1 88.1 91.8 88.0 94.8 88.0 93.2 90.9 58.1 90.4 50.0 90.8 64.0
ShrinkPad-2 88.7 22.7 88.6 40.8 88.1 67.1 92.1 14.9 90.9 18.2 90.5 24.2
ShrinkPad-3 88.7 2.6 88.2 10.1 88.2 19.8 90.7 6.5 90.7 6.5 90.3 11.1
ShrinkPad-4 87.6 1.6 88.3 1.8 87.5 3.7 91.4 1.5 90.6 1.8 89.9 4.8
Figure 7: Some poisoned images generated by different back-
door attack methods. In this experiment, the target label is
‘Deer’. Except for the Consistent Attack, the poisoned image
and the target label is not consistent.
shrinking size), and random zero-padding around the shrunk image
to recover the image size.
Defense Setup. We examine Flip and ShrinkPad with shrinking
size ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Except for aforementioned Flip and ShrinkPad,
we also conduct fine-pruning [27], neural cleanse [47], and auto-
encoder based defense (dubbed Auto-Encoder) [30], which are the
state-of-the-art defenses. The model with standard training and
testing process is also provided, which is dubbed Standard. Specif-
ically, the fine-pruning method consists of two stages, including
pruning and fine-tuning. Per the settings in the original paper, we
prune the parameters of the last component (convolutional layer
for VGG, convolutional block for ResNet). The original test set is
equally divided as two disjoint subsets, including the validation
set and the practical test set. The fraction of pruned neurons is
determined through grid-search on the validation set, and the per-
formance is evaluated on the practical test set. In particular, we
found that the fine-tuning with even one epoch may reactivate the
removed backdoor, therefore it is removed in the experiments. For
neural cleanse, all settings are based on the open-source code3 pro-
vided by the authors. For Auto-Encoder, we train the convolutional
auto-encoder [14] with 100 epochs, learning rate 0.001 and batch
size 16. The implementation is based on the open-source code4.
Above defense experiments are conducted on one single GeForce
GTX 1080 GPU.
Attack Setup.We use three representative state-of-the-art back-
door attacks, including BadNets [17], blended injection attack [7]
(dubbed Blended Attack), and label consistent backdoor attack [45]
(dubbed Consistent Attack) to evaluate the performance of back-
door defenses. The target label is Deer. Specifically, for BadNets,
except for the trigger appearance, other settings are the same as
those illustrated in Section 3.2. The non-zero pixel value is modified
from 128 to 255; For Blended Attack, the trigger is the same as the
one of BadNets, the ratio of poisoned samples is set to 0.2, and the
hyper-parameter α ∈ {0, 0.2}3×32×32. The values of the α entries
corresponding to the pixels located in the minimum covering box
are 0.2, while other values are 0; For Consistent Attack, the ratio of
poisoned sample over all training samples with target label is set to
0.25, and α ∈ {0, 0.25}3×32×32. The trigger of Consistent Attack is
quite different from the one used in BadNets and Blended Attack,
which is symmetrical. All these settings follow their original papers.
Some examples of poisoned sample generated by different attacks
are shown in Figure 7.
Results. As shown in Table 1, the proposed transformation based
defense is effective to reduce the adverse effects of attacked im-
ages, while slightly influences the classification performance of
clean/normal testing images. Specifically, ShrinkPad with 4 pixels
could decrease the ASR score by more than 90% in all cases. Flip
also shows satisfied defense performance to BadNets and Blended
attacks. But it doesn’t work on defending against Consistent at-
tack, due to the symmetrical trigger used in Consistent attack. The
state-of-the-art defense methods show similar performance with
the proposed method in most cases.
3https://github.com/bolunwang/backdoor
4https://github.com/jellycsc/PyTorch-CIFAR-10-autoencoder
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(a) Hue (b) Contrast
(c) Brightness (d) Saturation
Figure 8: Transformed attacked samples with different types of color-shifting. All images are randomly transformed with
maximum perturbation size ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}.
Table 2: The average training time (seconds) of different de-
fenses.
VGG-19 ResNet-34
Fine-Pruning ∼ 400 ∼ 600
Neural Cleanse ∼ 30000 ∼ 80000
Auto-Encoder ∼ 2000
Flip 0 0
ShrinkPad 0 0
However, note that the compared defense methods require addi-
tional training or optimization, while the proposed method only
involves an extra simple transformation of the image in the infer-
ence process. Compared to state-of-the-art methods, the proposed
transformation-based defense requires less additional costs. To
verify the efficiency of the proposed method, we report the aver-
age training time over defending all three attacks of each defense
method, as shown in Table 2. Besides, there is only one hyper-
parameter in ShrinkPad, i.e., the shrinking size, while there are
multiple hyper-parameters in compared methods.
In conclusion, transformation-based defenses (with spatial trans-
formation) reach competitive performance compared with state-of-
the-art defend methods, whereas with no extra training time and
fewer hyper-parameters to adjust.
5.2 Defense with Non-spatial Transformation
In this section, we also examine the effectiveness of proposed
transformation-based defense with non-spatial transformations.
Specifically, we evaluate two most widely used transformations,
including the additive Gaussian noise and the color-shifting, which
only change the trigger appearance while preserving its location.
Settings. We examine the performance of defense under ResNet-
34 structure. For the additive Gaussian noise, the mean is set as zero,
and the standard deviation (std), is selected from { 5255 , 10255 , 15255 , 20255 }.
We examine four types of color-shifting, including modifying hue
(dubbed Hue), modifying contrast (dubbed Contrast), modifying
brightness (dubbed Brightness), and modifying saturation (dubbed
Saturation). All images are randomly transformed with maximum
perturbation size ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}, based on the ColorJitter func-
tion provided in torchvision. Some examples of transformed at-
tacked images are shown in Figures 8-9.
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Table 3: Attack success rate and clean test accuracy under additive Gaussian noise with different standard deviation.
Standard Deviation (std)→ 5 10 15 20
Attack Type ↓ Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR
BadNets 91.2 100 79.8 100 58.1 100 36.4 100
Blended Attack 90.8 100 81.4 100 64.5 99.9 46.0 99.5
Consistent Attack 90.9 98.7 81.9 99.1 65.1 99.4 44.6 99.6
Table 4: Attack success rate and clean test accuracy under different types of color-shifting with different maximum pertur-
bation sizes. We examine four types of color-shifting, including modifying hue (dubbed Hue), modifying contrast (dubbed
Contrast), modifying brightness (dubbed Brightness), andmodifying saturation (dubbed Saturation). All images are randomly
transformed with maximum perturbation size ∈ {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}.
Maximum Perturbation Size→ 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Shifting Type ↓ Attack Type ↓ Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR Clean ASR
Hue
BadNets 93.2 100 91.6 100 89.4 100 88.5 100
Blended Attack 92.1 100 89.8 100 88 100 86.9 100
Consistent Attack 91.9 98.7 89.2 98.8 87.2 99 85.8 99.1
Contrast
BadNets 94.2 100 94.0 100 93.8 100 93.7 100
Blended Attack 92.9 100 92.9 100 92.8 100 92.6 100
Consistent Attack 93.0 98.5 92.8 97.9 92.6 97.5 92.4 96.4
Brightness
BadNets 94.1 100 93.9 100 93.7 100 93.4 100
Blended Attack 93.0 100 92.9 99.8 92.7 99.0 92.4 98.4
Consistent Attack 93.0 98.1 92.9 96.4 92.6 94.5 91.9 92.6
Saturation
BadNets 94.1 100 94.1 100 94.1 100 94.0 100
Blended Attack 93.1 100 93.1 100 93.0 100 93.0 100
Consistent Attack 93.0 98.7 93.0 98.8 93.0 98.7 92.8 98.7
Figure 9: Attacked samples with additive Gaussian noise.
Results. As shown in Tables 3 and 4, both the additive Gaussian
noise and color-shifting have limited effects on defending back-
door attacks. Especially for the additive Gaussian noise, despite
the use of a large standard deviation, ASR has not decreased even
though the clean accuracy has decreased by more than 30%. Be-
sides, color-shifting has limited effects on both defense performance
and clean accuracy. The possible reason is that the effects of these
transformations on the trigger appearance are not significant, as
shown in Figures 8. Moreover, the exact impact of the difference in
trigger appearance on the attack success rate of backdoor attacks
are still unclear, which will be further studied in the future work.
Accordingly, in the proposed transformation-based defense, we
recommend to use spatial-transformations instead of non-spatial
transformations.
5.3 Enhanced Backdoor Attack
Settings. In the enhanced backdoor attacks, we adopt random Flip
followed by random ShrinkPad in the random transformation layer.
Note that there is only one hyper-parameter in enhanced attacks,
i .e ., the maximal shrinking size, which is set to 4 pixels in this ex-
periment. We examine three enhanced backdoor attacks, including
enhanced BadNets (BadNet+), enhanced Blended Attack (Blended
Attack+), and enhanced Consistent Attack (Consistent Attack+)
with their correspondingly standard attack in the experiments. In
particular, when evaluating the ASR of enhanced attacks under
defenses, the random transformation is also adopted on the benign
training samples rather than only on the poisoned samples during
the training process. This modification is to exclude the possibility
that the transformation itself creates a new backdoor. For example,
the zero-padding in ShrinkPad may probably create a new backdoor
activated by the black edges of the image. If the random transforma-
tions are only adopted on the poisoned samples, we cannot identify
whether the improvement of ASR under ShrinkPad is due to that
the enhanced attacks are more robust to transformation, or due
to that the black edges introduced by ShrinkPad activate the new
edge-related backdoor of enhanced attacks. Other settings are the
same as those used in Section 5.1.
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Figure 10: The saliency maps of images under standrad backdoor attacks and correspondingly enhanced backdoor attacks.
(a)-(b): results under VGG-19; (c)-(d): results under ResNet-34.
Table 5: The comparison between standard backdoor attacks and enhanced backdoor attacks from the aspect of attack success
rate against different transformation-based defenses.
VGG-19 ResNet-34
Standard Flip ShrinkPad-2 ShrinkPad-4 Standard Flip ShrinkPad-2 ShrinkPad-4
BadNets 100.0 1.1 22.7 1.6 100.0 0.8 14.9 1.5
BadNets+ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Blended Attack 100.0 0.9 40.8 1.8 100.0 0.8 18.2 1.8
Blended Attack+ 99.9 99.9 100.0 98.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.5
Consistent Attack 95.6 95.7 67.1 3.7 98.7 98.8 24.2 4.8
Consistent Attack+ 86.0 86.3 97.2 90.9 96.4 97.3 97.4 98.7
Results. As shown in Table 5, enhanced backdoor attacks can still
achieve a high ASR even under the defenses with spatial transforma-
tions. Specifically, the ASR of enhanced backdoor attacks is better
than the one of their corresponding standard attack under defenses
in almost all cases. Especially under ShrinkPad with shrinking 4
pixels, the ASR improvement of enhanced attacks is more than 85%
(mostly over 95%). The only exception is the Consistent Attack+
under Flip defense. It is partially due to the fact the trigger of Con-
sistent Attack is symmetrical, as mentioned in Section 5.1. Besides,
the random trigger in the enhanced process makes it more difficult
to create the backdoor, compared to the fixed trigger in Consistent
Attack, which may require more poisoned images to achieve better
backdoor attack performance. However, compared to BadNets+ and
Blended Attack+, Consistent Attack+ poisoned fewer images (see
the attack settings), which is not favorable to the random trigger.
5.4 The Saliency Maps of Standard and
Enhanced Backdoor Attacks
Saliency maps in computer vision provide indications of the most
salient regions within images. By creating the saliency map for a
DNN model, we can obtain some intuition on where the network
is paying the most attention to in an input image. We visualize the
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saliency map [40] of attacked and transformed attacked images
under both standard attacks and enhanced attacks, based on which
we discuss the mechanism of attacks. The saliency maps is obtained
based on the open-source code5. The attacked images are trans-
formed by ShrinkPad with 4-pixels shrinking size. All standard and
enhanced attacks are the same as those used in Section 5.3.
As shown in Figure 10, the saliency area of regularly (i .e ., non-
transformed) attacked imagesmainly lies in the area of the backdoor
trigger on both standard attacks and enhanced attacks, while the
outline area of the object is not significantly activated. This phenom-
enon explains why these attacked samples can successfully mislead
backdoor networks. In particular, we notice that the saliency maps
under consistent attack are not as concentrated at the trigger as
those under BadNets and the blended attack. This is probably be-
cause they have different mechanisms. The label of the attacked
image is consistent with their ground-truth label in the training
process of the consistent attack, therefore the connection between
the trigger and the target label is less significant than that of Bad-
Nets and blended attack. Under standard attacks, the saliency maps
of transformed attacked images and those of regularly attacked
images enjoy significantly different patterns. For example, in con-
trast to the case of regularly attacked images, the saliency map of
transformed attacked images mainly activates at object structure
rather than at the backdoor trigger. On the contrary, the saliency
maps of transformed attacked images and those of regularly at-
tacked images share certain similarities under enhanced attacks.
The saliency maps of both types of attacked images concentrate on
the area of backdoor trigger, although such concentration is more
significant of transformed images.
5.5 Physical Attack
In real-world scenarios, the testing image may be acquired by some
digitizing devices (e.g., camera), rather than be directly provided in
the digital space by the user. For example, in the system of video
surveillance, the facial images are captured by the camera, then
fed into the model. To attack such systems, the poisoned testing
image should be firstly printed to a photo or a poster, which is
then digitized by the camera to fool the model. It is dubbed physical
attack. Since the relative location between the photo and the camera
is varied in practice, the digitized images of the same photo could be
different. Consequently, the location and appearance of the trigger
may be different from the designed ones by the backdoor attacker.
Here we study the effectiveness of the standard backdoor attack
and our enhanced attack under the setting of the physical attack.
Specifically, we evaluate BadNets and the enhanced BadNets+, on
the ResNet-34 model trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. We randomly
pick some testing images from CIFAR-10 to take picture with dif-
ferently relative location, as shown in Figure 11. Besides, we also
take some out-of-sample pictures that are totally different from the
training images in CIFAR-10, as shown in Figure 12.
In all results of both figures, BadNets+ successfully enforces
the prediction to the target label Deer, while BadNets fails. It is
interesting to see that the enhanced backdoor attack method is not
only robust in the physical backdoor attack, but also generalizes
well on out-of-sample images. This out-of-sample generalization
5https://github.com/MisaOgura/flashtorch
Figure 11: The pictures of some printed CIFAR-10 images
taken by a camera with different distances (near and far).
All pictures are classified as ‘Deer’ by the enhanced BadNets,
whereas theywill be classified as the label of the correspond-
ing benign image by the standard BadNets.
Figure 12: The picture of some out-of-sample images with
the backdoor trigger taken by a camera. All pictures are clas-
sified as the target label ‘Deer’ by the enhanced BadNets.
Figure 13: Attack success rate of enhanced attacks withmax-
imal shrinking size 4-pixels under ShrinkPad with different
shrinking size.
is probably due to the strong relationship between the backdoor
trigger and target label learned in the infected model, so that the
impact of the non-trigger part is somewhat ignored by the model.
The intrinsic reason will be further verified with more extensive
experiments in our future research.
5.6 Ablation Study
In this section, we study the effect of shrinking size in the proposed
defense, and the effect of maximal shrinking size in the enhanced
backdoor attack. Except for the studied hyper-parameters, other
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settings are the same as those used in Section 5.1 and Section 5.3
unless otherwise specified.
Figure 14: Attack success rate of enhanced backdoor attacks
w .r .t different maximal shrinking sizes under ShrinkPad-4
and Standard. First Row: ‘BadNets+’; Second Row: ‘Blended
Attack+’; Last Row: ‘Consistent Attack+’.
The effect of shrinking size in the transformation-based de-
fense. As demonstrated in Section 4.1, adopting ShrinkPad with
even 2 pixels shrinking size will significantly reduce the ASR of stan-
dard attacks. In this section, we discuss the effect of shrinking size
in defending against enhanced backdoor attacks. Specifically, we
evaluate the effect of defending the enhanced attacks with 4-pixels
maximal shrinking size.
As shown in Figure 13, the ASR decreases along with the increase
of the shrinking size under all settings. Although when the shrink-
ing size in ShrinkPad is not larger than the maximal shrinking size
used in enhanced attacks (i.e., 4 pixels), the ASR values are still
very high, indicating that the defense performance of ShrinkPad
is not satisfied. However, when the shrinking size is bigger than
the maximal shrinking size used in enhanced attacks (4 pixels), the
ASR will decrease dramatically. The above results indicate that the
shrinking size used in the ShrinkPad defense should be larger than
the maximal shrinking size used in enhanced attacks, to ensure the
satisfied defense performance.
The effect of maximal shrinking size in the enhanced back-
door attack.We evaluate the performance of the enhanced back-
door attack with different maximal shrinking sizes, to attack the
Standard model (no defense) and the model with the ‘ShrinkPad-4’
defense.
The attack results measured by ASR are shown in Figure 14. To
attack the Standard model, the ASR values are very high and are
almost unchanged when the maximal shrinking size varies. How-
ever, the ASR values of the Consistent Attack+ decreases along
with the increase of the maximal shrinking size. The larger value
of the maximal shrinking size indicates the more randomness of
triggers in training, which requires more poisoned training images
to create the backdoor. As mentioned in Section 5.3, the number of
poisoned training images in Consistent Attack+ is insufficient. To
attack the model with the defense ShrinkPad-4, when the maximal
shrinking size is smaller than the shrinking size 4 in ShrinkPad-4,
the ASR values increase from 0 to almost 100. When the maximal
shrinking size is larger than the shrinking size 4, the ASR values
of BadNets+ and Blended Attack+ are still about 100; but, the ASR
values of Consistent Attack+ become to decrease, still due to the
insufficiency of poisoned training images. These phenomena indi-
cate that the proposed attack enhancement can indeed reduce the
transformation vulnerability of existing backdoor attacks.
6 DISCUSSION
The main purpose of this paper is to explore a new paradigm of
designing backdoor attacks or defenses, that is, to design simple,
effective, and highly applicablemethods based on the characteristics
of backdoor triggers. The proposed transformation-based defense
is efficient, however, we do not claim that the performance of the
defense is superior to existing defense methods or is more difficult
to be evaded. Besides, we only verified that the proposed attack
enhancement can improve the robustness towards transformation.
The proposed attack extensions may probably not bypass existing
defense, which will be studied in our future work.
What we intend to emphasize is that the transformation vul-
nerability of the existing attack paradigm discussed in this paper
needs to be further considered for both attackers and defenders. For
example, attackers should consider adding the proposed random
transformation-based extension in their designed attacks, and the
proposed transformation-based defense should also be an important
baseline for all defend methods to compare.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explore the property of backdoor attacks. We iden-
tify that existing attacks are sensitive to the difference between the
training trigger and testing trigger. We further demonstrate that
existing attacks are transformation vulnerable, inspired by which
we propose a transformation-based defense to transform the test-
ing image before feeding into prediction. This simple strategy is
experimentally verified to be effective to defend classical backdoor
attacks. The defense performance is on par with state-of-the-art
defenses, while with nearly no extra computational cost. Besides,
to reduce the transformation vulnerability of existing backdoor
attacks, we propose a random transformation-based enhancement
by conducting the random spatial transformation on the training
images with the trigger before feeding into the training process.
Extensive experiments verify that the enhanced backdoor attack
is robust to spatial transformations, and is also effective under the
settings of physical attack. This work has shown that it is possible
to develop simple but effective methods for backdoor defenses and
attacks, by utilizing some intrinsic properties of backdoor triggers.
We hope that our approach could inspire more explorations on back-
door characteristics, to help the design of more advanced backdoor
defense and attack methods.
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